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SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 
IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
NORBERT TRIBL* 
THE scientific public opinion in Europe now considers the concept 
of constitutional identity as a highlighted issue. There are some who 
interpret it as the manifestation of a conflict in Europe. Neverthe-
less, the constitutional identity is a bridge between the Member 
States and the EU rather than a river washing away the achievements 
of the integration. 
The concept of constitutional identity appears in the Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems (or legal literary conceptions) and in the suprana-
tional system of European integration under different lights and ap-
proaches. While in Anglo-Saxon approaches, the interpretation of 
legal institutions in conformity with the Constitution is understood 
under it1, the European concept seems to be applied when possible 
conflicts between the legal system of the European supranational 
space and certain provisions of the national constitutions of the 
Member States arise2. In other words, the European concept intends 
to offer input for the determination of the nature of the relationship 
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between the constitutional provisions of the Member States and the 
legal acts of the EU integration.  
There is academic consensus regarding the fact that the exact 
meaning and content of constitutional identity has not yet been de-
fined, however, the ultimate interpretation and concept of constitu-
tional identity must materialize in the jurisprudence of the high 
courts of the Member States in charge of the interpretation of the 
Constitution3. Based on the above and the practice of these high 
courts4, the constitutional identity shall contribute to the “self-
definition” of the constitutional systems of the respective Member 
States, as the ensemble of fundamental constitutional provisions 
and institutions with historical origins defining the constitutional 
system that shall remain untouchable by EU law. 
In the EU system of multilevel constitutionalism, a long-standing 
central debate on integration surrounds the conflict between EU le-
gal acts and the constitutional provisions of the Member States. 
Even though the Court of Justice of the European Union stated in 
Costa v. E.N.E.L. that Member States cannot refer to the provisions 
of their respective national constitutions against the integration5, 
based on the experience of more than 50 years since the above deci-
sion, and also in light of the Treaty of Lisbon, we now can clearly 
see that EU law has itself identified an obligation for the EU to pro-
tect the fundamental constitutional features of the Member States 
under Article 4 (2) TEU, by respecting the national identities of 
Member States6. In order to understand the problem and the concept 
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of constitutional identity in this context, however, it is necessary to 
determine a coordinate system, within which the concept is to be 
defined and applied. This coordinate system is multilevel constitu-
tionalism7. Going beyond the legal framework, not only the co-
existence of constitutional systems, but also the common identity of 
coexisting and mutually dependent European cultures and democ-
racies shall also be examined, in light of national sovereignty and 
common European values. 
Although the European Union is an international organization es-
tablished by an international treaty, it already has formed a specific 
legal system, the supreme feature of which is supranationalism. 
(Moreover, the founding international treaty that has since been 
recognized as a constitutional charter as well.) We can highlight the 
ability of an international organization (through its own institutions) 
to oblige its Member States to specific actions despite their will as 
one of the key features of supranationalism8. At this point, the trans-
fer of competences and the concept of shared sovereignty are 
brought into the analysis while, at the same time, the applicability 
of the classical sovereignty theory needs to be questioned as part of 
a sovereignty-integrity dilemma. 
The consequence of this supranational nature is the so-called 
constitutional paradox9, or Frankenstein’s syndrome10, according to 
which by empowering the constitution of a sovereign legal system, 
the state joins a legal order, the acts of which (partly) require (or 
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would require) unconditional enforcement. Sometimes even against 
the provisions of national constitutions, as decided early on by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Costa vs. E.N.E.L. Inter-
estingly, European cooperation in the supranational space is based 
on this anomaly, the operation of which can be described as a 
multi-level constitutional system, centered on the institution of 
transferring sovereign competences to exercise authority in deci-
sion-making, which concept was originally designed to define the 
very specific constitutional structure of the EU11 and, in particular, 
the relationship between national constitutions and European law12. 
The relationship between Member States’ constitutions and Euro-
pean law is reflected in the so-called Lisbon-decisions of national 
Constitutional Courts13, and almost since the beginning of the exis-
tence of integration, such declarations have been made by these 
courts, which contained reservations regarding the application of 
EU law, having regard to the provisions of the national constitu-
tions. So, we can say that the existing anomaly around which the 
European integration has been built is tried to be resolved unilater-
ally by the Court of Justice of the European Union with the primacy 
of EU law even over national constitutions. In contrast, the Consti-
tutional Courts of the Member States, as the sole guardians of na-
tional constitutions, are constantly making attempts at defining the 
identity of their respective constitutional systems as European Mem-
ber States, respecting the CJEU’s case law and simultaneously pro-
tecting the sovereignty and constitutional provisions of the Member 
States. It should be noted, however, that the conflict between EU 
law and the constitutional provisions of the Member States is not 
only a matter of theoretical and political underpinnings, but it also 
raises the issue of the “competences” on the part of the CJEU and 
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the national constitutional courts. While the authentic interpreter of 
the European law (and the Treaties) is the CJEU, the authentic in-
terpreters of the national constitutions are the national constitutional 
(and the supreme) courts. 
The constitutional identity, as a feature of the European constitu-
tional systems which embodies and encapsulates the uniqueness of 
the Member States, can be a suitable instrument to alleviate the ten-
sions arising from the constitutional paradox, even if identity can-
not (possibly) solve the paradox. However, since the genesis of the 
paradox lies in the indivisibility of state sovereignty and the rela-
tionship between the national constitutions and the European legal 
order, it is also necessary to examine the theory of sovereignty as 
well14. In terms of a legal definition, a state is sovereign if it has ter-
ritory, a population and supreme power, and if it can act autono-
mously in its external relations and has been recognized by other 
countries. However, in the system of multi-level constitutionalism, 
for a real understanding of sovereignty, we must separate the con-
cept of sovereignty in law and in political sciences. Because in the 
view of political sciences, sovereignty is the right to make the ulti-
mate political decision, which is not a legal category15. We should 
also not forget that the European Union is primarily a political or-
ganization and the rule of law and the constitutionalism are not na-
tural characteristics thereof but the results of political decision- and 
constitution-making (also motivated by political decisions). On the 
other hand, its survival is not automatic and needs political protec-
tion against both internal and external threats16. Consequently, sov-
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ereignty represents the source of the exercise of supreme power and 
at the same time implies the right to exercise that power (limited by 
state self-restraint) through the Constitution and international com-
mitments. 
Examining sovereignty and the transfer of powers and compe-
tences within the European Union, it must be taken into account 
that the transfer of competences shall be a central political decision, 
which leads to the conclusion that the ultimate carriers of sover-
eignty can be the Member States. Considering the above, the consti-
tutional identity (in the view of sovereignty) may impose a quasi 
limitation on the transfer of powers and competences, which is im-
portant because transferred powers are the defining characteristics 
of the supranational space. At the same time, we should not forget 
the necessary statement that the fate of the transfer of competences 
(in legal terms) depends on the state-theoretical conception of inte-
gration. Namely: if we accept the theory that the European Union is 
moving from its quasi confederal nature towards becoming a fed-
eral state, the transfer of sovereignty is a temporary institution that 
ensures the stability of relations between the Member States and the 
integration, until the final status of integration is reached. At the 
end of this process the federal state would become the bearer of 
sovereignty, but in the meantime, we only can be witness to a “fed-
eration by stealth”, and a slow but steady extension of transferred 
competences by the EU, at times going against the ultimate political 
decision-makers and holders of sovereignty on the level of the Mem-
ber States. 
If we look at the integration as a completely new category in state 
theory, not wanting to place it on a scale between the confederation 
and the federation, then the transfer of competences and constitu-
tional identity both can be seen as defining characteristics of this 
new concept, which might be characterized by some as underdevel-
oped, which truth is attributable to the evolving nature of the entity 
itself. In this case, the problem that should be resolved is the stabi-
lization of fundamental power (or constitutional) relations between 
Member States and the integration, which, however, is no longer a 
question of legal or state theory, but one of a political decision, to 
which the classical theory of sovereignty may not apply. Regarding 
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the issue of sovereignty and integration, there are basically three 
definitive scientific positions17: The first approach states that sover-
eignty in the Member States is maintained, it continues to be held 
by MS, and the integration cannot be(come) the holder of sover-
eignty (i). The second approach revolves around a gradual transfer 
of sovereignty - where supreme state authority gradually shifts from 
the Member States to the Union (which shift is normally unaffected 
by the MS) - this one called the theory of “federalism by stealth” 
(ii). According to the third approach, the European integration is a 
new political and state-theoretical structure in which sovereignty is 
gradually declassified, and the traditional sovereignty theory is ren-
dered useless and obsolete by the intricate relationships between 
Member States and the integration (iii). 
To sum up: Regarding the transfer of competences, the constitu-
tional identity can partially answer the question: What scope does 
the power of integration have and what is the extent of the power of 
the Member States? However, the earlier described fundamental 
political nature of this issue requires prudent interpretation by the 
MS constitutional courts, since, if - hypothetically speaking - they 
would define constitutional identity uniformly, as a clearly distin-
guishable constitutional relationship between the Member States and 
the integration, then at this moment the Constitutional Courts would 
vindicate the power of political decision-making for themselves, re-
alizing judicial governance. Such a determination necessarily would 
become a fundamental political decision that can only be taken by 
the National Assemblies of the Member States at the level of the 
founding treaties. Dispensing with the examination of the Constitu-
tional Courts’ practice in this study, the third approach described ear-
lier seems to be the closest to the truth, according to which the new 
political and state-theoretical structure of the EU will finally to some 
extent declassify, degrade the classical theory of sovereignty, with 
the addition that the sovereignty of the Member States will never be 
totally dissolved in the integration. 
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ABSTRACTS / RÉSUMÉS 
The scientific public opinion in Europe now considers the concept of con-
stitutional identity as a highlighted issue. There are some who interpret it 
as the manifestation of a conflict for Europe. Nevertheless, constitutional 
identity is a bridge between the Member States and the EU rather than a 
river that will wash away the achievements of the integration. The concept 
of constitutional identity appears in the Anglo-Saxon legal systems in a 
different approach than in the supranational system of European integra-
tion. While in Anglo-Saxon approaches, the interpretation of legal institu-
tions in conformity with the Constitution is understood under it, the Euro-
pean concept is to be applied when possible conflicts between the legal 
system of the European supranational space and certain provisions of the 
national constitutions of the Member States arise. In other words, the Euro-
pean concept intends to offer input for the determination of the nature of 
the relationship between the constitutional provisions of the Member 
States and the legal acts of the EU integration. 
 
L’opinion publique scientifique en Europe considère de nos jours le 
concept de l’identité constitutionnelle comme un enjeu majeur. Certains 
l’interprètent comme la manifestation d’un conflit pour l’Europe. Néan-
mois, l’identité constitutionnelle est un pont entre les Etats membres et 
l’UE plutôt qu’une fleuve qui fera disparaître les acquis de l’intégration. Le 
concept d’identité constitutionnelle apparaît dans les systèmes juridiques 
anglo-saxons selon une approche différente de celle du système suprana-
tional d’intégration européenne. Alors que dans les approches anglo-
saxonnes, l’interprétation des institutions juridiques conformément à la 
Constitution est entendue en vertu de cette dernière, le concept européen 
doit être mis en œuvre quand des conflits éventuels entre le système juri-
dique de l’espace supranational européen et certaines dispositions des 
constitutions nationales des Etats membres surgissent. En d’autres termes, 
le concept européen vise à contribuer à la détermination de la nature de la 
relation entre les dispositions constitutionnelles des Etats membres et les 
actes juridiques de l’intégration européenne. 
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